Justice Wilson and the Charter: An Engagement to Keep by Lee, Tanya




Volume 41 (2008) Article 12
Justice Wilson and the Charter: An Engagement to
Keep
Tanya Lee
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Lee, Tanya. "Justice Wilson and the Charter: An Engagement to Keep." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference 41. (2008).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol41/iss1/12
 
Justice Wilson and the Charter: 
An Engagement to Keep 
Tanya Lee∗ 
I. THE CHARTER AS A STATEMENT OF FAITH 
Justice Wilson is an important figure for one reason: she served on 
the Supreme Court of Canada at the moment of judicial freedom that 
existed in the first years of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1 and she seized that moment.2 Very few legal figures have 
made such a significant contribution to their country. She, and the other 
members of the Court, interpreted an untouched constitutional 
document, the subject of no previous judicial decision. And the Charter 
was not just any constitutional document. Its words rang: freedom of 
expression and religion, freedom from discrimination, the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person, the right to vote. It invited the courts 
to wrestle with the question of being human in a democracy. 
It was a heady time. The excitement in the air for Canadians 
generally and for the legal community in particular was palpable. The 
                                                                                                             
∗ Tanya Lee, Counsel, Constitutional Law Branch, Attorney General of Ontario. The 
views expressed are my own and not those of the Ministry of the Attorney General. I was honoured 
to work for Justice Wilson as a law clerk at the Supreme Court of Canada in the early years of the 
Charter. During my time at the Court there were hearings or judgments drafted in the following 
cases (among others): R. v. Jones, infra (freedom of religion); R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., 
infra (Sunday closing); Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), infra; Public 
Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, infra; Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. 
Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) (Labour Trilogy); Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] S.C.J. No. 
31, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801 (S.C.C.); Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] S.C.J. No. 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
857 (S.C.C.); Caron v. Caron, [1987] S.C.J. No. 32, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.) (spousal support 
trilogy); R. v. Wigglesworth, infra (legal rights); and R. v. Morgentaler, infra (abortion). 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 Justice Wilson served on the Supreme Court of Canada between 1982 and 1990. She was 
sworn in on March 30, 1982: Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”], at xiv, xvi, 
128. The Charter came into force on April 17, 1982 (with the exception of the s. 15 equality rights 
provision, which came into force on April 17, 1985). It took about two years for the first Charter 
cases to work their way up to the Supreme Court of Canada: Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian 
Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), at 309 [hereinafter “A 
Judge’s Journey”].  
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process leading to the adoption of the Charter was characterized by 
debate, divisiveness and decision. Its adoption signalled the start of 
something new. Justice Wilson appreciated that Canadians had hopes for 
the Charter and stated “Canadians view the Charter as a statement of 
faith . . . and they expect it to usher in a new era in the quest for 
equality”.3 She wondered if their expectations would be fulfilled and 
undertook to meet those expectations.4  
Justice Wilson was keenly aware that the first few years of the 
Charter constituted a window of opportunity. There could be no “broader 
mandate for judicial creativity”5 than the Charter. The early decisions 
under the Charter were of “crucial importance”6 and “our eye must be on 
the future rather than on the past”.7 
Remember in those days, everything was unknown and anything was 
possible. The Charter might protect corporate economic rights, 
commercial speech, hate speech, collective bargaining and the right to 
strike, a minimum standard of living, reproductive freedom, freedom 
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, or it might not. 
There was no book to pull off the shelf. So for a brief while, lawyers 
pulled books off other people’s shelves in a quest for helpful legal 
materials. They became instant “experts” on American constitutional 
law, nodding knowingly as they discussed the Lochner era and discrete 
and insular minorities and plain view search and seizures. They 
discovered there was a plethora of international human rights 
instruments. Legal theory was no longer an abstract pursuit but could be 
cited as authority for a proposition because no other authority could be 
found. 
The sense of excitement was tempered by an equal sense of 
seriousness and obligation. Justice Wilson described the judicial role in 
interpreting the Charter as a “tremendous responsibility”8 and noted that 
                                                                                                             
3 Bertha Wilson, “Law in Society: The Principle of Sexual Equality” (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 
221, at 224. 
4 Id., at 224. 
5 Bertha Wilson, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1985) 50 Sask. L. Rev. 169, at 
171. 
6 Id., at 173. 
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
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it would take energy, skill, sensitivity and courage “to meet the 
expectations of those who have laid this burden on us”.9 
II. FORGING A CONSENSUS 
Justice Wilson is a figure who commentators lionize as an equality 
icon or trivialize as maverick dissenter and extreme judicial activist. 
However, in fact, she, along with other key members of the early Court, 
forged a consensus on an interpretive approach to the Charter which 
constitutes a lasting legacy. 
No single judge determined the shape of the Charter. In the Supreme 
Court there is more than one vote in every case. However, Justice 
Wilson, along with Chief Justice Dickson and then Justice Lamer (later 
Chief Justice), created a climate of Charter interpretation which carried 
the Court.10 While they did not always agree on the result in any given 
case or indeed the meaning of any given right, they did agree on certain 
approaches to the Charter which still are accepted today.  
1. Commitment to the Charter Project 
Their first and most important move was to lay to rest the ghost of 
the Bill of Rights11 and to actively commit to the task that the Charter 
assigns — judicial review of legislative action in light of Charter rights. 
This active commitment was not a given at the time but, once made, 
gave force and vitality to the Charter project. 
The Supreme Court stated, and Justice Wilson agreed, that it was 
“empowered, indeed required, to measure the content of legislation 
against the guarantees of the Constitution”.12 If legislation violated those 
guarantees, it must be struck down. Because elected representatives 
                                                                                                             
9 Id. The Supreme Court of Canada described the Charter as a “new and onerous 
responsibility”: Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 486, at 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”]. 
10 W.H. McConnell, William R. McIntyre: Paladin of the Common Law [hereinafter 
“William R. McIntyre”] (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press for Carleton 
University, 2000), at 192; A Judge’s Journey, supra, note 2, at 296. 
11 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
12 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 9, at 496. Justice Wilson also underlined the duty 
of the Court to measure the contents of legislation against Charter requirements: Bertha Wilson, 
“Decision-Making in the Supreme Court” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227, at 238 [hereinafter ‘“Decision-
Making’”]; Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at 472 
(S.C.C.), per Wilson J. [hereinafter “Operation Dismantle”].  
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enacted the Charter and entrusted its interpretation to the courts 
“[a]djudication under the Charter must be approached free of any 
lingering doubts as to its legitimacy.”13 
2. Legal Materials: Casting Off Constraint 
What legal materials would assist the Court in Charter interpretation? 
Justice Wilson observed that there is a temporal aspect to the judge’s 
policy-making role. At any point in time, a complete range of policy 
options is not available because the judge is faced with the constraints of 
existing legal materials.14 In the case of the Charter, however, there were 
no binding legal precedents and the Court itself would determine the 
relevance of other existing legal materials. 
(a) Bill of Rights 
The Supreme Court quickly decided that the jurisprudence under the 
Bill of Rights was of little assistance in Charter interpretation. In the 
1960s, the federal government enacted the Bill of Rights, an ordinary 
statute which applied only to federal laws. Perhaps because it was not 
entrenched, the courts took a timid approach to its enforcement and the 
case law was widely regarded as formalistic and a bit of an 
embarrassment.15  
The Supreme Court noted that the Charter, unlike the Bill of Rights, 
was a constitutional document, and rejected the frozen rights theory 
advanced under the Bill of Rights which held that the rights were 
protected only as they existed at the time of enactment.16 Nevertheless, in 
a case which came before it concerning the rights of refugee claimants, 
                                                                                                             
13 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 9, at 497.  
14 Bertha Wilson, “Law and Policy in a Court of Last Resort” [hereinafter “‘Court of Last 
Resort’”], F. McArdle, ed., The Cambridge Lectures 1989 (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1990), at 227-28. 
15 A Judge’s Journey, supra, note 2, at 309, 380; Andrews v. Law Society of British 
Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at 166-68, 170 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Andrews”]; “Decision-Making”, supra, note 12, at 245. 
16 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] S.C.J. No. 18, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 
at 365-66 (S.C.C.); Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 
11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at 209 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”], per Wilson J., Dickson C.J.C., Lamer 
J.; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 342-44 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Big M Drug Mart”]; R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 1326-
27 (S.C.C) [hereinafter “Turpin”].  
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half of the judges decided the issue based on the Bill of Rights.17 It was 
Wilson J. (also writing for Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J.) who did not 
hesitate to decide the case under the Charter. The Bill of Rights has seen 
little action since.18 
(b) Common Law  
Another possible source of legal materials was the common law 
itself. Prior to the Charter, Canadians lived in a liberal democracy where 
they enjoyed many rights conferred by statute or common law. No judge 
on the Supreme Court thought that Charter rights were limited to 
existing common law rights or that the common law was of no relevance 
whatsoever. However, between these extremes different conceptions 
emerged. 
One view was that the Charter was rooted in common law and 
statutory rights.19 Another view, and one that prevailed, was that the 
Charter invited a fresh look at those rights, in light of Charter guarantees. 
As the Court explained, existing common law rules were not conclusive 
because it would be wrong to assume that the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter “are cast forever in the straight-jacket [sic] of 
the law as it stood in 1982”.20 The “Charter has fundamentally changed 
our legal landscape”21 and a common law rule relevant to a fundamental 
right “may be too narrow to be reconciled with the philosophy and 
approach of the Charter and the purpose of the Charter guarantee”.22 
Instead of the Charter conforming to the common law, it was the 
common law that had to conform to the Charter. The Charter binds 
government and does not apply to a dispute between private litigants 
governed by the common law. Nevertheless, even in such a dispute, the 
Court held that the common law should be modified in light of Charter 
                                                                                                             
17 Singh, id.  
18 In Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 40, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40 
(S.C.C.), a claimant challenged legislative expropriation of interest on pensions relying on the Bill 
of Rights instead of the Charter because it provided more explicit protection of property rights. The 
claim, nonetheless, failed.  
19 William R. McIntyre, supra, note 10, at 186-88; Reference re Public Service Employee 
Relations Act, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 394, 403-404 (S.C.C.), per McIntyre J.; 
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. 
No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 583-86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dolphin Delivery”]. 
20 R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, at 163 (S.C.C.). 
21 Id., at 164. 
22 Id. 
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values.23 The common law “does not grow in isolation from the Charter, 
but rather with it”.24 
(c) American Constitutional Law 
The rights jurisprudence of other jurisdictions was another possible 
source of legal materials. American constitutional law, in particular, was 
expected to be a particularly rich vein to mine. It is a long, sophisticated 
tradition which has wrestled with defining human rights in many fact 
situations. In the words of Justice Wilson, “[r]eading through an 
American constitutional law text is like walking through modern human 
existence in an afternoon.”25 Like any such tradition, the American 
tradition has its glories and its ignominies. It has its mistakes. 
Justice Wilson said that “Canadian judges are very fortunate to be 
able to approach their new responsibilities [under the Charter] armed 
with a wealth of American case law and learned writing on the nature of 
fundamental rights.”26 Nevertheless, she indicated that judges should 
avoid a mechanical application of concepts that come from constitutional 
documents with a fundamentally different structure from the Charter27 
and from societal conditions that differ from those in Canada.28 The 
Supreme Court itself stated that care must be taken in placing reliance on 
the interpretation of constitutions different in structure and purpose from 
our own.29 
Justice Wilson, writing concurring reasons in Operation Dismantle,30 
a case about the federal government’s decision to allow the United States 
                                                                                                             
23 Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 19, at 603; Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] S.C.J. 
No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at 1164-72 (S.C.C); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, 
Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, at 167-68 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pepsi-Cola”]. A question that can arise is, when is it the duty of the Court and 
when is it the duty of the legislature to modify the common law? See R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] 
S.C.J. No. 18, 2008 SCC 18 (S.C.C.). 
24 Pepsi-Cola, id., at 167. 
25 Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution” (1988) 71 Judic. 334 [hereinafter “‘The 
Making of a Constitution’”], at 334. 
26 Id., at 335. 
27 Id., at 335-36. 
28 Id., at 335; see also Bertha Wilson, “Constitutional Advocacy” (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 
265, at 272 [hereinafter “‘Constitutional Advocacy’”. Justice Wilson was kind enough to prepare 
and deliver this paper for a retreat held by the Ontario Attorney General’s Constitutional Law 
Branch.  
29 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 9, at 498; Turpin, supra, note 16, at 1316-17 (per 
Wilson J. writing for the Court); A Judge’s Journey, supra, note 2, at 317-18.  
30 Operation Dismantle, supra, note 12.  
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to test cruise missiles in Canada, rejected an American constitutional law 
argument that the courts should not become involved because this was a 
“political question”. She reviewed the American jurisprudence and 
academic debate on the political questions doctrine and rejected it. In her 
view, there was no doubt that, where the question was whether 
government action violated the Constitution, it was proper for the courts 
to decide it.31 Justice Dickson, writing majority reasons, specifically 
agreed with Wilson J. that Cabinet decisions and disputes of a political 
or foreign policy nature are reviewable by the courts to ensure 
compatibility with the Constitution.32 
It is remarkable, looking at the Supreme Court’s work in those early 
years, how quickly it unleashed itself from American case law. To be 
sure, where apposite, it looked at American cases. However, it quickly 
came to rely more on its own emerging jurisprudence under the Charter. 
Its insights were the benchmark and, in many instances, its approach and 
results differed from that of the Americans. The Supreme Court, with the 
help of Justice Wilson and others, created a rich, nuanced and 
distinctively Canadian approach to rights. Thanks to it we have had our 
own triumphs. We have made our own mistakes. 
(d) Framers’ Intent 
Finally, the Supreme Court considered the framers’ intent theory. 
Under this theory, the intent of those who negotiated, drafted and 
adopted the Charter is critical in determining its meaning. Justice Wilson 
had little patience for this idea. Speaking of the theory in the American 
context, she stated that it was impossible to know what the framers of 
the American Bill of Rights meant 200 years ago — they could not have 
had any opinion about issues which did not exist at the time. Further, 
their intent should not hinder modern constitutional interpretation 
because they came from a period that was less tolerant, democratic and 
open-minded than our own.33 
The Supreme Court decided that framers’ intent would be given little 
weight in Charter interpretation. Framers’ intent was difficult to prove 
because many individuals played major roles in the adoption of the 
Charter and their intent could not be gleaned from the statements of a 
                                                                                                             
31 Id., at 472, per Wilson J. 
32 Id., at 455, 459. 
33 “The Making of a Constitution”, supra, note 25, at 336-37. 
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few. To treat framers’ intent as binding would freeze Charter rights at 
the moment of adoption with little possibility of development or 
response to changing societal needs. Finally, the Court stated that issues 
had arisen that were unforeseen by the framers.34 
The Supreme Court rejected the theory although “[i]n Canada, only 
two years, not two centuries, had passed since the adoption of the 
Charter.”35 Therefore, the framers’ mindset was accessible and social 
conditions had not changed dramatically. While courts undoubtedly must 
proceed as best they can if issues arise that the framers did not consider, 
that is different from rejecting framers’ intent when known. 
The Supreme Court’s disregard for framers’ intent likely sprang 
from a prosaic cause. When the Americans speak of framers’ intent, they 
speak of those who drafted the American Bill of Rights, of revolutionary 
heroes, of Madison and Jefferson. In contrast, the Charter was the 
product of its age, of its champions, such as Prime Minister Trudeau, but 
also of public participation and submissions, lobbying, federal-provincial 
negotiation, judicial intervention36 and political brinkmanship. Unlike the 
American founding fathers, the framers of the Charter were alive and 
kicking and available for comment. However, if they had been called as 
witnesses, the Supreme Court likely would have seen these individuals, 
despite their outstanding contributions, as contemporary practitioners of 
the rough art of politics, not as golden historical figures. Perfection is 
more easily perceived from afar. 
3. Choosing Their Own Course 
The Supreme Court strengthened the moment of judicial freedom 
created by the Charter by regarding the common law, the rights 
jurisprudence of other countries and framers’ intent as informative but 
not determinative of Charter rights. In so doing, it ensured that the 
meaning of the Charter came from its decisions on a going forward 
basis. What considerations would inform these decisions? In brief, it 
decided that these decisions would be driven by a purposive approach to 
rights grounded in social reality as demonstrated by the effect of the law 
and evidence. 
                                                                                                             
34 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 9, at 508-509; see also United States of America v. 
Cotroni, [1989] S.C.J. No. 56, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, at 1480 (S.C.C.). 
35 A Judge’s Journey, supra, note 2, at 318. 
36 Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.); Re: Objection 
to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] S.C.J. No. 101, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.). 
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(a) A Purposive Approach 
The Court adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of 
rights. The purpose of a right is to be generously interpreted “in light of 
the interests it was meant to protect”.37 Regard is to be had to the objects 
of the Charter, the language of the text, the historical origins of the right 
and, at times, the purpose of other rights.38 
This approach was enthusiastically echoed by Justice Wilson in 
many decisions.39 For her, the purposive approach meant that “the rights 
guaranteed in the Charter should be interpreted in accordance with the 
general purpose of having rights, which is to secure for individuals and 
minority groups protection against the exercise of excessive power by 
the majority.”40 In addition, “judges should strive to capture within their 
decisions the purpose of each individual right, meaning the best modern 
theory that can be devised to justify the existence of the right in 
question.”41 
(b) Law and Social Reality 
Justice Wilson strongly believed that constitutional interpretation 
was a progressive, evolving enterprise, “while the constitutional 
document is static, the Constitution is dynamic and progressively 
shaped, … always unfinished and ... always evolving”.42 Law should not 
be based on an obsolete image of society, but should change to reflect 
new social values.43 Writing for the Court, she held that when 
determining a Charter violation, regard must be had to the larger 
political, social and economic reality.44  
When interpreting equality rights, Wilson J. observed that the 
discrete and insular minorities protected under section 15 would change 
                                                                                                             
37 Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 16, at 344. 
38 Id. 
39 For example, R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 163-64 
(S.C.C.), per Wilson J. 
40 Bertha Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8 [hereinafter “‘We 
Didn’t Volunteer’”], at 9. 
41 “The Making of a Constitution”, supra, note 25, at 338. 
42 Id., at 334, 338; see also, “Court of Last Resort”, supra, note 14, at 227-28, 236; “We 
Didn’t Volunteer”, supra, note 40, at 8-9.  
43 “Court of Last Resort”, supra, note 14, at 227-28. 
44 Turpin, supra, note 16, at 1331-32; Andrews, supra, note 15, at 152 (per Wilson J. 
writing for herself, Dickson C.J.C. and L’Heureux-Dubé J.). 
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with changing political and social circumstances. It can be anticipated 
that the “discrete and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups 
not recognized as such today”.45 
(c) A Law’s Effect 
The Court determined that a law could be invalidated on the basis of 
its purpose or effect. The purpose is the object the legislature intended to 
achieve through the legislation. The effect is the impact produced by the 
operation and application of the legislation.46 Justice Wilson 
characterized the Charter as “first and foremost an effects-oriented 
document”.47 This focus on the effect of the law removed the discussion 
from the realm of the lawmaker and placed it in the world of the citizen. 
It emphasized not how the law was meant to work, but how it does work.  
(d) Evidence 
The Court championed the use of a wide range of evidence in 
Charter cases holding that extrinsic evidence concerning the operation 
and effect of legislation was admissible.48 It was willing to consider 
legislative facts that established the purpose and background of 
legislation, including its social, economic and cultural context.49 Not 
only was such evidence admissible but the Court insisted upon the 
presentation of a factual basis in most Charter cases including a wide 
spectrum of scientific, social, economic, policy and expert evidence.50 A 
party’s failure to introduce such evidence could lead to defeat.  
The Court tied the admission of evidence to a burden of proof 
model. Individuals bear the burden of proving that an enumerated right, 
such as the right to freedom of expression, freedom of religion or 
freedom from discrimination, has been violated. Once that burden had 
been discharged, the government has the onus of proving that its law 
meets the requirements of section 1 of the Charter which provides that 
                                                                                                             
45 Andrews, id., at 153. 
46 Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 16, at 331. 
47 Id., at 360, per Wilson J. 
48 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 9, at 505-507. 
49 Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 92, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at 
1099 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Danson”]; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at 703-
704 (S.C.C.). 
50 MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at 366 (S.C.C.). 
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rights are “subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. The burden of 
proof throughout is a civil standard of proof based on a preponderance of 
probability.51 
Justice Wilson supported the use of an expanded evidentiary record 
to provide solid factual underpinnings in Charter cases. Without such 
evidence, “judges will be unable . . . ‘to transcend the limitations of their 
egos’ and will rely upon their own personal values systems in 
interpreting and applying the Charter”.52 When making decisions, judges 
bring to bear their own experiences which, like the experiences of any 
individual, are necessarily limited. Evidence can broaden a judge’s 
understanding by introducing the perspectives and lived histories of 
others. However, Justice Wilson warned against allowing expert 
evidence “to dictate the scope and meaning of the Constitution”.53 
Historical, economic and social data gives the background for 
constitutional interpretation. However, it is judges who must decide what 
values are protected by the Constitution.54 
Because the Supreme Court linked the admission of legislative facts 
to a burden of proof model, Justice Wilson’s warning has not always 
been heeded. The Court, on occasion, has acted as though the resolution 
of fundamental human rights issues is best understood as an evidentiary 
ruling. Value preferences are described as factual findings. 
For example, in Chaoulli55 the Supreme Court found that legislation 
which prohibited the purchase of insurance for private sector health care 
services, if such services were provided under the public health care 
plan, was unlawful. The government argued that the prohibition was 
necessary to preserve the public health care system. Based on its 
characterization of the evidence, the Court disagreed. It rejected experts 
and reports supporting the government’s position, saying they were 
based on “common sense” and “theory”, not on the evidence.56 Instead 
the Court, in holding the prohibition unlawful, relied on the fact that 
                                                                                                             
51 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136-37 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Oakes”]. 
52 “Constitutional Advocacy”, supra, note 28, at 267, quoting Cardozo J. 
53 Id., at 270. 
54 Id. 
55 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 
[hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. Four judges found the legislation unlawful. One judge based his ruling on 
the Quebec Charter, three on the Canadian Charter, and three judges dissented. 
56 Id., at 853-54, 858. 
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other countries did not have such a prohibition and instead used both 
private and public health care delivery.  
However, this fact does not demonstrate that allowing private health 
care has no impact on other countries’ public health care systems or 
results in better health care than that enjoyed by Canadians. We can 
assume that within those countries, as in Canada, there are critiques of 
the health care provided. Given the numerous trade-offs involved in the 
delivery of health care to large populations and the different social 
conditions present in each country, a fair comparison of the results 
achieved would require a far more detailed assessment of the evidence 
than is present in the decision.57  
Further, the assessment of the evidence in this, as in many other 
Charter cases, is difficult because the issue is what social policies will 
achieve desired objectives, not who went through a red light or even who 
murdered a victim. A society is not a controlled laboratory experiment. It 
is large, complex and multi-faceted, the product of the decisions and 
actions of millions of individuals. In such an environment, deciding 
which levers will produce a desired result is no more than a best guess. 
In Harper,58 the Supreme Court, confronted with a challenge to third 
party advertising limits during elections, acknowledged this home truth. 
The government argued that the purpose of the limit was to ensure 
election fairness. The Court noted that the harm caused by third party 
advertising was difficult, if not impossible, to measure scientifically 
because of the subtle way advertising influences behaviour, the impact 
of other factors, such as media and polls, and the multitude of issues, 
candidates and individual parties involved. It held that, when faced with 
inconclusive or competing social science evidence, it can rely on logic 
and reason in assessing constitutionality.59 
In summary, Justice Wilson was correct in her view that while 
legislative facts are important in providing the Court with information 
about the factual underpinning of a case, the effect of a law and social 
realities, constitutional analysis should not be understood as an 
evidentiary ruling. It should be understood as the resolution of 
                                                                                                             
57 The dissent in Chaoulli, supra, note 55, made similar points concerning the 
conclusiveness of the evidence offered on the experience in other countries: per Binnie, LeBel and 
Fish JJ., at 892-94.  
58 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”]. 
59 Id., at 873-75. 
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conflicting values rooted in evidence but resolved, not by evidence 
alone, but by principle. 
(e) Precedent 
The final link which joins constitutional analysis to evolving social 
realities is judicial attitudes towards precedent. When a court decides an 
issue, that decision creates a precedent. If the issue arises again, the 
court’s view of precedent will determine whether it will follow its 
previous decision, even if it does not agree with it, or whether it feels 
free to revisit, revise or reject the decision.  
Justice Wilson identified the tension between achieving certainty in 
the law and ensuring its adaptability to changing social conditions.60 She 
noted that “[p]recedent can obviously be viewed as an ultimate 
formulation of pure principle independent of context, or it can be seen as 
merely a useful mechanic for marshalling past experience for present 
choice.”61 Because of her belief that the law should be grounded in social 
realities, Justice Wilson preferred the latter view. She warned that judges 
“should not, in their anxiety, ‘not to introduce today’s politics into 
today’s law’ fall into the trap of ‘introducing yesterday’s politics into 
today’s law’”.62 Following established doctrine may result in applying 
the prejudices of a previous age. 
As noted, in the early period, there was great judicial freedom in 
interpreting the Charter because there was no precedent. However, going 
forward, the debate about precedent will become a key one, as it is in the 
United States, where nominees for the United States Supreme Court are 
grilled on whether they will honour precedents, notably, but not 
exclusively, in the area of reproductive freedom.  
The Supreme Court’s most dramatic treatment of Charter precedent 
is its recent decision63 reversing its earlier decision64 that freedom of 
                                                                                                             
60 “Decision-Making” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227, at 228. 
61 Id., at 233. 
62 Bertha Wilson, “Court of Last Resort”, in F. McArdle, ed., The Cambridge Lectures 
1989 (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1990) at 236, quoting Hon. E. Hall, “Law Reform and the Judiciary’s 
Role” (1972) 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 399, at 405. 
63 Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”]. 
64 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories 
(Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Northwest 
Territories”]; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, 
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association does not include the right to collective bargain (or the right 
to strike). It now has found that freedom of association does include a 
procedural right to collective bargain. This explicit, acknow-ledged 
reversal is dramatic because the Court’s earlier decision had been hard-
fought, extensively reasoned and among its most significant.  
Importantly, the Supreme Court did not argue that its reversal was 
necessary to adapt the law to changing social realities. The position of 
the labour movement in Canada is not significantly different than before. 
Nor did it rely on the strength of the earlier dissenting judgments, written 
by Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Wilson, which had found a right to 
collective bargain and to strike.65 Instead it went through the reasoning of 
the earlier majority decision, found that it did not agree, and changed the 
law. The implications of this both for labour relations and other keystone 
Charter decisions will be interesting to observe. 
4. A Frame for the Picture 
In summary, the Supreme Court, in the early years of the Charter, 
constructed an interpretive frame. Justice Wilson was an active and 
important participant in achieving a consensus on the proper approach to 
Charter interpretation, a consensus which has held to the present day. 
While we now take for granted the Charter’s force and vitality, it was 
not a foregone conclusion. The Charter, like its predecessor, the Bill of 
Rights, could have degenerated into an arid formalism. The Supreme 
Court’s decision to recognize a sea change, to commit to the protection 
of rights, and to place that protection within an understanding of the 
modern society inhabited by Canadians, was a profound one. Having 
constructed a frame, the Court now had to place within it a picture of 
rights and democracy, a picture of itself and its role.   
                                                                                                             
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Saskatchewan, 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.). 
65 Justice Wilson and Dickson C.J.C. dissented in the Labour Trilogy. However, in 
Northwest Territories, id., Dickson C.J.C., because he felt himself bound by the precedent of the 
Labour Trilogy, found that there was no right to collective bargaining. 
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III. BROAD AND CONTESTABLE TERMS  
1. Definition of Individual Rights 
The early Court began to decide the meaning of each protected right. 
As discussed, Justice Wilson advocated a purposive and generous 
approach to the definition of rights. She felt that, given the presence of 
section 1 in the Charter, there was less need to find internal limits within 
the definition of the rights.66 Any justification for the violation of rights 
should be considered under section 1 rather than in the definition of the 
right.67 This did not mean that she found a violation of rights in every 
instance: “[t]he rights under the Charter not being absolute, their content 
or scope must be discerned quite apart from any limitation sought to be 
imposed upon them by the government under section 1.”68 
2. Section 7 
While there are a number of examples of Justice Wilson limiting the 
scope of the right through definition of the right including legal rights,69 
freedom of religion,70 freedom of association and expression,71 and 
                                                                                                             
66 “The Making of a Constitution” (1988) 71 Judic. 334, at 336. 
67 Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 1325-26 (S.C.C.). 
68 Operation Dismantle, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at 489 (S.C.C.), per 
Wilson J.; see also R. v. Jones, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 314 (S.C.C.), per 
Wilson J. 
69 She wrote an important majority judgment for the Court concerning s. 11 of the Charter 
which confers a number of critical rights to persons charged with an offence, including the right to 
be tried within a reasonable time, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and not to testify 
against oneself. She refused to apply it to all legal proceedings and instead restricted it to 
prosecutions for public offences involving punitive sanctions, i.e., criminal, quasi-criminal and 
regulatory offences. A matter fell within s. 11 either because, by its very nature, it was a criminal 
proceeding or because a conviction in respect of the offence led to a true penal consequence. In 
reaching this conclusion, Wilson J. did a careful analysis of the text of s. 11, including its marginal 
notes, and compared the text to the language of a similar provision in the Bill of Rights. She 
considered the need to give a consistent interpretation to the section in all the proceedings to which 
it applied and to provide certainty for authorities who prosecute offences: R. v. Wigglesworth, 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 (S.C.C.). 
70 Justice Wilson was clear that a trivial or insubstantial effect on freedom of religion 
would not constitute a violation of that right, for to hold otherwise “would radically restrict the 
operating latitude of the legislature”: Jones, supra, note 68, at 314, per Wilson J. quoting, Braunfeld 
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, at 606 (1961). The Supreme Court accepted this proposition and it has 
persisted, to date, as one of the few constraints in the definition of freedom of religion: Syndicat 
Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at 584 (S.C.C.); Bruker v. 
Markovitz, [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607, at para. 67 (S.C.C.). 
71 In a case challenging the requirement to pay union dues on the basis that it violated 
freedom of association and freedom of expression, she wrote reasons, attracting substantial support 
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equality rights,72 Justice Wilson has a reputation for broadly defining 
Charter rights largely based on her approach to section 7 of the Charter. 
From the beginning, it was obvious that section 7 (along perhaps 
with the equality rights section) had the potential to be the broadest of 
the Charter provisions. It provides: “Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” As 
Justice Wilson noted, these are “broad and contestable terms”.73 The 
early Court was concerned to ensure that its interpretation of this section 
would not haunt it in the future.74 While most judges approached section 
7 gingerly, Justice Wilson seemed to prefer grounding her decisions in 
that section.75 
(a) Life, Liberty and Security 
Justice Wilson led, and the rest of the Court followed, in deciding 
two threshold issues concerning section 7. First, she decided that section 
7 rights could be asserted by every human being physically present in 
Canada, regardless of whether they were citizens.76 Second, she decided 
that under section 7 a claimant must demonstrate only that his or her life, 
liberty or security had been violated; not that all three had been 
violated.77 However, she went further than this in interpreting section 7 
and when she did, failed to carry the early Court. Most judges in the 
                                                                                                             
on this point, which found that freedom of association did not embrace the freedom not to associate 
and that forced payments did not violate freedom of expression because such payments did not 
convey support for the union or its activities, particularly where the individual remained free not to 
join the union and to express his own views: Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 
[1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.), per Wilson and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ., concurred 
with on this point by Cory J. The Supreme Court dismissed the claim. 
72 Interestingly, in equality rights, she was an early proponent of the idea that the purpose 
of s. 15 is to protect against demonstrated discrimination, stereotype, prejudice and affronts to 
human dignity: McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at 
387, 391-92 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J. [hereinafter “McKinney”]; Law v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at 527, 529 (S.C.C.). 
73 “The Making of a Constitution”, supra, note 66, at 334; see also Jones, supra note 68, at 
317-18, per Wilson J. 
74 “Constitutional Advocacy” (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 265, at 272; James MacPherson, 
“Canadian Constitutional Law and Madame Justice Bertha Wilson — Patriot, Visionary and 
Heretic” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 217, at 237 [hereinafter “‘Patriot, Visionary and Heretic’”]. 
75 “Patriot, Visionary and Heretic”, id. 
76 Singh, [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at 202. 
77 Id., at 204-205. This conclusion for half the court in Singh was later accepted by the 
whole court in Motor Vehicle Reference, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 500-501 
(S.C.C.). 
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early cases, without foreclosing other possibilities, defined the words 
“liberty” and “security” as narrowly as possible given the desired 
outcome. Their focus was on physical restraint, interference with bodily 
integrity and the criminal context.78  
In contrast, Wilson J. argued that liberty guaranteed the individual’s 
freedom “to plan his own life to suit his own character, to make his own 
choices for good or for ill”.79 When discussing the protection afforded by 
section 7 she said “the basic theory underlying the Charter [is] that the 
state will respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent 
possible, will avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of 
the good life.”80 Elsewhere Wilson J.’s description of section 7 was 
narrower. Most importantly, she said that the right to liberty did not 
extend to all individual choice but was limited to a degree of personal 
autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting private lives.81 
Thus, in Jones she held that liberty protects parents’ right to raise 
their children in accordance with their conscientious beliefs. The 
relations of affection between an individual and his family are central to 
an individual’s sense of self and of his place in the world.82 In 
Morgentaler, she found that liberty protects the profoundly personal 
decision of a woman to terminate her pregnancy.83 
(b) Principles of Fundamental Justice 
Justice Wilson acknowledged that individuals’ rights under section 7 
were not absolute and must accommodate the corresponding rights of 
others.84 However, she maintained that Charter rights “erect around each 
individual, metaphorically speaking, an invisible fence over which the 
state will not be allowed to trespass. The role of the courts is to map out, 
piece by piece, the parameters of the fence”.85 
                                                                                                             
78 Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C., 
Lamer , Beetz and Estey JJ. 
79 Jones, supra, note 68, at 318, per Wilson J. 
80 Morgentaler, supra, note 78, at 166, per Wilson J. 
81 Id., at 171, per Wilson J. 
82 Jones, supra, note 68, at 319, per Wilson J. 
83 Morgentaler, supra, note 78, at 171, per Wilson J. 
84 Operation Dismantle, supra, note 68, at 488-89, per Wilson J.; Jones, supra, note 68, at 
319, per Wilson J. 
85 Morgentaler, supra, note 78, at 164, per Wilson J. 
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However, her interpretation of the relationship between liberty and 
security, the principles of fundamental justice and section 1 allowed little 
room for state incursion on individuals’ liberty and security. Early on, 
she floated the idea that even where the government action infringing 
life, liberty or security of the person is in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice, it would nevertheless have to be justified under 
section 1.86 The Court never entertained this position and she did not 
pursue it. Instead, under section 7, the government can infringe liberty 
and security as long as it does so in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
In the Motor Vehicle Reference,87 the Supreme Court consi-dered 
whether the principles of fundamental justice were procedural or 
substantive — whether section 7 allowed the government to limit liberty 
and security as long it was done pursuant to a fair procedure, or whether 
its reasons for limiting rights were subject to judicial review as well. In a 
watershed determination, the Supreme Court rejected arguments, based 
on framers’ intent, textual analysis, the right’s purpose and appropriate 
institutional roles, all of which supported a procedural definition. It was 
convinced that section 7 could go beyond procedural protections but still 
allow the Court to avoid, through the articulation of objective and 
manageable standards, the adjudication of the merits of public policy.88 It 
stressed that a law would violate the principles of fundamental justice 
only if it contravened the “basic tenets of our legal system”.89  
Justice Wilson’s view of the “basic tenets of our legal system” test is 
unclear. She cautioned against a comprehensive or restrictive definition 
of the phrase “principles of fundamental justice” early in the 
jurisprudence.90 In her writing, there is an implicit criticism of the “basic 
tenets of our legal system” test as failing to “meet social, economic and 
political values head on”.91 
In her major judgments on section 7, instead of relying on this test, 
she propounds the idea that the principles of fundamental justice are 
violated where the government infringes not only an individual’s life, 
                                                                                                             
86 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 77, at 523, per Wilson J. 
87 Id. 
88 Id., at 499. 
89 Id., at 503. 
90 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1218-19, per Wilson J. [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”]. 
91 “Court of Last Resort”, supra, note 62, at 223-24; Robert E. Hawkins & Robert Martin, 
“Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson” (1995) 41 McGill L.J. 1, at 40. 
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liberty and security interest but also another Charter right. Thus in 
Morgentaler, she found that the government’s restriction on access to 
abortion violated women’s liberty and security and was not in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice because it also violated 
women’s freedom of conscience. She found this latter violation by 
defining freedom of conscience in essentially the same manner as she 
had defined the liberty interest — as the individuals’ freedom to make 
choices consistent with their beliefs.92 Under this construction, it is 
difficult to imagine a legislative provision which implicated liberty 
which also would not violate freedom of conscience. Similarly, in the 
Prostitution Reference, a case concerning the Criminal Code prohibition 
on communication in public for the purpose of prostitution, she found 
that the prohibition, which impinged on liberty by virtue of its potential 
for imprisonment, violated the principles of fundamental justice because 
it also violated freedom of expression.93 Justice Wilson also felt that 
violations of section 7 were nearly impossible to justify as a reasonable 
limit under section 1.94  
Accordingly, Justice Wilson’s approach to section 7 leads to the 
illogical result that when a law violates a liberty or security interest and 
another right, no further examination of the principles of fundamental 
justice is required and any justification under section 1 becomes virtually 
impossible. Simultaneously, if the law violates another right which 
violation normally could be justified under section 1, it suddenly 
becomes unjustifiable because there is also a violation of section 7. Thus 
when there is an infringement of liberty and security and another right, 
the government has no avenue for advancing a justification, no matter 
how worthy its objectives.   
(c) Summary 
Justice Wilson, in some passages, described the scope of section 7 in 
very broad language. If this broad language were accepted, her approach 
would amount to judicial colonization of a country’s decision-making. 
The judiciary, in the final analysis, would decide whether any legislative 
                                                                                                             
92 Morgentaler, supra, note 78, at 175-80. 
93 Prostitution Reference, supra, note 90, at 1220-22.  
94 Id., at 1223; see also Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 77, at 523, per Wilson J.; 
Jones, supra, note 68, at 322, per Wilson J.; R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R 933, 
at 1034 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J. The Court as a whole has found little scope for the application of s. 1 
when there is a breach of s. 7: Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 77, at 518. 
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decision struck the appropriate balance between the individual and the 
state. It would patrol the lines of the fence. On this view of section 7, the 
rest of the Charter is superfluous as the whole world is contained in the 
words of section 7. However, in other passages, Justice Wilson sounds a 
quieter note and restricts liberty to important decisions intimately 
affecting private lives.  
3. Justice Wilson Finds an Audience 
While initially Justice Wilson was isolated in her views of section 7, 
the Court has since accepted some of them. The limiting of liberty and 
security to physical restraint, interference with bodily integrity and the 
criminal context, as present in the early majority judgments, has 
disappeared. Justice Wilson’s view of section 7 as a protector of 
important decisions intimately affecting private lives is no longer the 
view of an outlier renegade but rather has found an audience in and 
acceptance by the Court. 
The Supreme Court, citing Wilson J.’s decision in Morgentaler, has 
held that the liberty interest protected by section 7 is not restricted to 
freedom from physical restraint but is engaged where state compulsions 
or prohibitions affect important and fundamental life choices.95 It also 
has held that security of the person includes state-imposed serious 
psychological stress concerning a matter of fundamental importance 
where the state interferes with profoundly intimate and personal 
choices.96  
Interestingly, the areas where liberty and security have received a 
warm reception by the Court are those that provided the springboard for 
Justice Wilson’s broad conception of liberty: familial relations, 
particularly parent-child relations, and health and medical decisions. 
Thus it has held that both child protection proceedings97 and excessive 
waiting times for public health care when combined with a ban on 
private health care insurance98 affect security of the person. 
The Supreme Court has not pursued Justice Wilson’s unique idea 
that the violation of other rights leads to breach of the principles of 
                                                                                                             
95 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 307, at 340-42 (S.C.C.). Morgentaler, supra, note 78. 
96 Id., at 355-56. 
97 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.). 
98 Chaoulli, [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.). 
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fundamental justice under section 7. However, it has concluded that a 
law can violate the “basic tenets of our legal system” and hence the 
principles of fundamental justice where it is grossly disproportionate to 
the state interest99 or is arbitrary in the sense that it bears no relation to or 
is inconsistent with the objectives behind it.100 When applied aggressively, 
these tests may lead to substantive review of legislation which is akin to 
patrolling the lines of the fence between the state and the individual. 
In summary, under section 7, the Supreme Court has held that when 
legislation interferes with issues of fundamental importance to 
individuals, the Court may engage in a substantive review of the 
government’s decision. It, like Justice Wilson, may have adopted this 
approach because it is aware that the Canadian state, on occasion, has 
been guilty of discriminatory and oppressive behaviour towards its 
citizens.101 Should the Court be confronted by such behaviour, it wants a 
weapon to fight it. The challenge, of course, is to recognize the 
difference between a historical moment where the democratic state, 
through its actions, begins to devour itself and the Court, as guardian of 
the Constitution, must intervene, and the more quotidian clash of 
legitimate viewpoints in the democratic arena. The Court, having armed 
itself for battling the former, should not be tempted to enter the arena to 
smite the latter. 
IV. VALUING DEMOCRACY — SECTION 1 
1. Setting the Standard 
Once a court has found a violation of a right, the question becomes 
whether the violation can be justified under section 1 of the Charter. 
Justice Wilson was aware that the standard established for section 1 was 
pivotal: “If too low a threshold is set, the courts run the risk of 
emasculating the Charter. If too high a threshold is set, the courts run the 
risk of unjustifiably restricting government action.”102 
The early court in a unanimous judgment in Oakes outlined the test 
for section 1: to justify a violation of a right a government must show 
that the legislative objective is pressing and substantial, rationally 
                                                                                                             
99 R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at 650-51 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Clay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735, at 752-53 (S.C.C.). 
100 Chaoulli, supra, note 98, at 852. 
101 McKinney, supra, note 72, at 354, per Wilson J. 
102 Singh, supra, note 76, at 217. 
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connected to the objective, impairs the right no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective and is proportionate between the effects of the 
law and the objective.103 
2. Impermissible Objectives 
In early decisions, Justice Wilson evinced discomfort with section 1 
and the idea that the “welfare of the many”104 could justify the breach of 
individual rights. In her view, utilitarian considerations105 and pragmatic 
compromises106could not justify overriding rights under section 1. For 
this reason, she was the judge who first identified cost and adminis-
trative convenience as impermissible objectives under the Oakes test and 
that continues to have some currency.107 However, as catchphrases, cost 
and administrative convenience can obscure as much as they illuminate. 
                                                                                                             
103 Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
104 “The Making of a Constitution” (1988) 71 Judic. 334, at 338. 
105 Id. 
106 In R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Edwards Books”], the Supreme Court considered a Sunday closing law which required 
businesses to close on Sunday with an exception for small retailers if the business had been closed 
the previous Saturday. Of the six judges who upheld the law, three concurred in reasons which 
upheld the law because it was a satisfactory balancing of the religious freedom of retail store owners 
against the interest of their employees in enjoying a common pause day with their families. Justice 
Wilson held the law unconstitutional, finding that it was unacceptable to recognize the religious 
freedom of some members of a religious group and not others. The legislature cannot adopt a 
compromised scheme of justice but must affirm a principle which is applicable to all: Edwards 
Books, at 808-810, per Wilson J. In a similar vein, Wilson J. alone found that for the federal 
government to fight inflation generally by imposing wage control legislation only on the public 
service was unconstitutional. Justice Wilson thought that if both the public and private sectors were 
free to engage in collective bargaining, then the public sector employees alone should not be 
deprived of this freedom in order to send a message to the private sector: Public Service Alliance of 
Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424, at 455-58 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J. 
107 In Singh, supra, note 76, at 218-19, Wilson J., writing for three members of the Court 
who found a Charter violation, rejected a government argument that to give refugee claimants an 
oral hearing would impose an unreasonable administrative burden, both in terms of time and money, 
on the Immigration and Refugee Appeal Board. In United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 
S.C.J. No. 56, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, at 1514-15 (S.C.C.), Wilson J., dissenting, found that it was a 
violation of s. 6 mobility rights to extradite an accused to the United States, when the actions of the 
accused took place in Canada, notwithstanding that there were many factors, including the location 
of evidence and witnesses, that would have made it more administratively convenient to prosecute 
in the United States. In Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] S.C.J. No. 125, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 483, at 554-55 (S.C.C.), Wilson J. found that a policy that required doctors to retire at age 65 
subject to exceptions could not be justified on the basis that it was more administratively convenient 
to remove incompetent doctors this way rather than through individual performance reviews. 
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(a) Costs 
The vindication of Charter rights results in costs because there is an 
embedded cost within some rights (for example, the right to legal aid in 
child protection proceedings or to trial within a reasonable time). 
Individuals also have claimed that the Charter guarantees them direct 
monetary payments from government. For example, there was an 
unsuccessful claim that the Charter required government to provide 
social assistance recipients with a certain level of income.108  
In addition, costs arise when individuals make equality claims for 
benefits based on section 15. The government is not constitutionally 
required to provide the benefits. However, once it has provided them to 
some, it may be discriminatory not to extend them to others. There are a 
number of hurdles to such a claim, including the question of whether the 
group receiving the benefits is the proper comparator group,109 the 
definition of the benefit,110 the ameliorative nature of a targeted program111 
and the impact of the distinction on human dignity.112 Nevertheless, there 
have been successful claims for benefits on the basis of a comparative 
claim.113 
Governments have advanced prohibitive costs as a constitutional 
justification for denying a program or benefit to claimants. The Supreme 
Court is very skeptical of this argument114 but has accepted it where it 
felt the government was facing a financial crisis.115 
                                                                                                             
108 Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), [1996] O.J. No. 363, 134 
D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. C.J.), leave to appeal refused [1996] O.J. No. 1526 (Ont. C.A.), [1996] 
S.C.C.A. No. 373 (S.C.C.). 
109 Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.). 
110 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 
71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.). 
111 Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.). 
112 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.). For a recent revisiting to the Law test and a questioning of the human dignity 
factor in s. 15 analysis, see R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41 (S.C.C.). 
113 Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.); Nova Scotia 
(Workers’ Compensaton Board) v. Martin, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Martin”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 
429, at 457 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]. 
114 Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 147 (S.C.C.).  
115 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NAPE”]; in Hislop, supra, note 113, at 457, a case concerning a claim for 
retroactive remedy where a s. 15 violation had occurred, the Court acknowledged that cost could be 
a factor under s. 1, although not an available justification on the record before it. However, as a 
remedial matter, its award of prospective but not retroactive benefits was undoubtedly influenced by 
cost concerns. 
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Generally the cost of vindicating Charter rights is borne by 
government, which must analyze the cost within its revenue envelope.116 
Every order to increase benefits to rights-holders means the loss or 
diminution of benefits to others. Justice Wilson believed that 
constitutional rights should have the first claim on the distribution of 
available government funds. She allowed the government leeway in the 
allocation of resources only in cases where there were competing 
constitutional claims for fixed resources and the vindication of one 
constitutional right would come at the expense of another constitutional 
right.117 
However, the Supreme Court, recognizing that most government 
expenditures go to health, education and social assistance, has said that 
cost is not just a case of “rights versus dollars”; it is also a case of “rights 
versus hospital beds, rights versus layoffs, rights versus jobs, rights 
versus education and rights versus social welfare”.118 It concluded it is 
“not convincing simply to declare that an expenditure to achieve a s. 15 
objective must necessarily rank ahead of hospital beds or school 
rooms”.119 Accordingly, constitutional rights do not invariably trump 
other claims for government resources.  
The issue of costs should be addressed not only within the scope of 
section 1 but perhaps more importantly within the definition of the right 
itself.120 When a right is defined, the costs associated with that definition 
should be measured to ensure that this is an appropriate draw on the 
resources of society. Further, the Court’s equality analysis applies to a 
social policy landscape which assists many groups to varying degrees 
and which inevitably is a product of history and accretion. Care must be 
taken to ensure that the jurisprudence establishes incentives for 
government to be innovative and progressive in establishing new 
programs and improving old ones. Where the government is not 
constitutionally required to provide a benefit, it is better for the 
government to assist vulnerable groups than to retreat from the fray 
                                                                                                             
116 Occasionally the costs of providing a Charter right to an individual may be borne directly 
by other individuals. Justice Wilson would have struck down mandatory retirement notwithstanding 
that it made fewer jobs available to the young: McKinney, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
229, at 403 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J. 
117 Id., at 404, per Wilson J. 
118 NAPE, supra, note 115, at 414. 
119 Id., at 421. 
120 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) 
[hereinafter “Constitutional Law”], at 38-31. 
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because of a potentially costly judicial extension of a program beyond its 
intended beneficiaries.  
(b) Administrative Convenience 
Large service delivery structures, whether in the public or private 
sector, require sophisticated operational models to succeed. While 
funding for these structures is certainly a major factor in their successful 
operation, it is not the only one. The nature of the service, its deliverers 
and recipients will often impact on administration, including access to 
the service and the timeliness in which it is provided.  
The Supreme Court decisions affording a Charter right to an oral 
hearing for refugee claimants121 and establishing maximum times 
between committal and trial of an accused criminal122 had profound 
consequences for the operation of the immigration and criminal justice 
systems respectively, leading in the latter case to the staying or 
withdrawal of thousands of criminal charges.123  
The Supreme Court has come to acknowledge the validity of 
operational arguments in constitutional cases. It agreed that in workers’ 
compensation schemes the benefits available cannot be customized to 
individual needs but must be classified by types of injury or illness for 
reasons of administrative efficiency. Individuals benefit from the 
reduced transaction costs and speed with which the claims are addressed. 
Without such techniques “large-scale compensation might well be 
impossible”.124  
While administrative convenience should never justify the violation 
of rights, there are operational realities that exist. To use an extreme 
example, General Motors could not build all its cars for a year in one 
day, even if it was ordered to do so by a court. If the government can 
                                                                                                             
121 Singh, [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.). 
122 R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Askov”]. 
123 In the 12 months following the Askov decision, id., over 47,000 charges were stayed or 
withdrawn in Ontario: Constitutional Law, supra, note 120, at 52-11. 
124 Martin, supra, note 113, at 558; similarly, in Wynberg v. Ontario, [2006] O.J. No. 2732, 
82 O.R. (3d) 561 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 441 (S.C.C.), where it 
was claimed that an early intervention program should be provided to all children with autism and 
not just to those under the age of six, the Ontario Court of Appeal, upholding the government 
program, found that given the scarcity of professionals who were trained to administer the program, 
removing the age limit would increase waiting lists and divert available resources away from the 
younger children for whom the program was most effective.  
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demonstrate that its delivery of services constitutes a best practice, given 
operational realities, the section 1 standard should be met. 
3. The Quest for a Purposive Approach to Section 1 
(a) Deference, Unease and Oversight 
Justice Wilson’s consideration of the issues of cost and 
administrative convenience took place pursuant to the Oakes test. There 
can be no dispute that the Oakes test for the analysis of section 1 is one 
of the most significant Charter judicial annotations. It has stood the test 
of time. Its strengths are many. It has a series of steps, which is always 
appealing to the legal mind, captures important considerations and 
allows facts, with relative ease, to be slid into its matrix. Its weakness is 
that it is an abstract, one-size-fits-all test. It does not articulate contextual 
factors which make it more or less difficult to justify government 
legislation in a given case. After the first few years, the Court began to 
feel this weakness and grapple more closely with issues of deference to 
the legislature and justification for the breach of protected rights. 
Justice Wilson herself had a deep unease with the notion of judicial 
deference to the decisions of government. She asked “whether a policy 
of deference to the legislature comports easily with a duty of judicial 
review designed to protect the entrenched rights of citizens”125 and 
expressed her “difficulty reconciling the two”.126 
She had a particular view of government which shaped her attitude 
towards deference. She accepted and even desired a large government 
role in society.127 After reviewing the role played by government in 
Canada, she concluded that it had not been a “monolith of oppression”128 
but instead had played a beneficent role in solving numerous social, 
political and economic problems. In her view, freedom was not “co-
extensive with the absence of government”129 but often required “the 
intervention and protection of government against private action”.130 
However, she did not believe that therefore the Court should stand aside 
and let the government do its good work. In her view, it was precisely 
                                                                                                             
125 “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8, at 9. 
126 Id. 
127 Judging Bertha Wilson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), at 63. 
128 McKinney, supra, note 101, at 354, per Wilson J. 
129 Id., at 356, per Wilson J. 
130 Id. 
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because of government’s large role that it was vital that oversight 
functions, such as judicial review under the Charter, be robust and 
vigilant in protecting individual rights. She did not simply want more 
government, she wanted just government.131 Judicial review under the 
Charter ensured just government by “setting out basic constitutional 
norms rooted in a concern for individual dignity and autonomy which 
government [is] compelled to respect when structuring important aspects 
of citizens’ lives.”132 
Despite her concerns about deference, Justice Wilson, along with 
Justices Dickson and Lamer, in the case of Irwin Toy133 wrote a joint 
majority judgment which, in many ways, is as important as the Oakes 
test for section 1 because it articulates when the government should be 
given greater leeway in justifying the infringement of rights. The 
judgment stated that the government should be given greater leeway 
where it is acting to protect the vulnerable134 or mediating between 
competing groups, particularly where there is an assessment of 
conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified demands on scarce 
resources. In such cases, the question under section 1 should be whether 
the government had a reasonable basis for concluding that it impaired 
the relevant right as little as possible given its objectives.135 In contrast, 
the government would be given less leeway where it is the singular 
antagonist of the state, typically in the case of criminal sanctions and 
prosecutions.136 
As evidenced by her participation in this judgment, Justice Wilson 
was not an Oakes absolutist. She acknowledged that imposing an 
obligation to safeguard Charter rights above all else could impose 
intractable difficulties and that, on occasion, a more relaxed standard 
was appropriate.137 However, her starting point was that the full rigours 
of the Oakes test should be applied. It was only in exceptional 
circumstances that it should be ameliorated.138  
                                                                                                             
131 Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 127, at 305; Philip L. Bryden, “The Democratic 
Intellect: The State in the Work of Madam Justice Wilson” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 65, at 75-76. 
132 McKinney, supra, note 101, at 358, per Wilson J. 
133 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]. 
134 Id., at 993-94.  
135 Id.; McKinney, supra, note 101, at 304-305, 309. 
136 Irwin Toy, id., at 994; McKinney, id., at 305. 
137 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 211, at 295 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J. 
138 McKinney, supra, note 101, at 404-405, per Wilson J.  
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After Irwin Toy, Justice Wilson remained of the view that deference 
was appropriate where the government sought to promote or protect the 
interests of the vulnerable, disadvantaged and disempowered.139 
However, she became less convinced that it should apply in cases of 
competing claims, particularly when they were competing claims for 
scarce resources. As discussed above, it was only when the competing 
claims for scarce resources were all made by constitutional rights-
holders that she felt that more of an argument for deference could be 
made.140 
Justice Wilson’s fears concerning a relaxed Oakes test came to a 
head in a criminal case where the majority upheld a Criminal Code 
provision on the basis that, while Parliament may not have chosen the 
absolutely least restrictive means of meeting the objective, it had chosen 
from a range of means which impaired rights as little as possible. It was 
not the role of the Court to second-guess policy choices made by 
Parliament.141 Justice Wilson argued that because the state was acting as 
the singular antagonist of a basic legal right of the accused, the standard 
of review must be a strict one rather than a relaxed one.142 
After her retirement, Justice Wilson reflected on what had occurred 
in respect of deference under section 1. She described the Supreme 
Court as paying lip service to the Oakes standard and replacing it with a 
standard of reasonableness because of lingering doubts about the 
legitimacy of judicial review. She maintained that adherence to the 
Oakes standard was necessary to ensure that Charter rights were not 
emasculated and concluded that “judicial review and deference to the 
                                                                                                             
139 McKinney, id., at 401, per Wilson J.; Lavigne, supra, note 137, at 295, per Wilson J. Her 
interest in protecting the vulnerable, disadvantaged and disempowered is demonstrated in her 
judgments concerning the rights of refugees (Singh, [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 
(S.C.C.)), women (Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.)), children (Irwin 
Toy, [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.)), and workers (the Labour Trilogy — 
Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
313 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
424 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.)): see “Patriot, Visionary and Heretic” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 217, at 
235. She also provided input into Dickson C.J.C.’s judgment in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 
131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) upholding restrictions on hate speech because of their impact on 
racial and religious minorities: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), at 
408-409. 
140 McKinney, supra, note 101, at 403-404, per Wilson J.; R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
1303, at 1388-89 (S.C.C.), per Wilson J. [hereinafter “Chaulk”]. 
141 Chaulk, id., at 1343.  
142 Chaulk, id., at 1390, per Wilson J.; see also Cotroni, supra, note 107, at 1515-16, per 
Wilson J. 
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legislature are an incompatible pair and I fear that our attempt to 
combine them has simply resulted in a muddying of the jurisprudential 
waters”.143 
However, with respect, the question is not whether the Court should 
generally defer to the legislature; it should not. Justice Wilson was 
correct in her rejection of judicial deference as an answer to Charter 
cases as it would simply result in victory for the government in every 
case. Nevertheless, as a judicial attitude, deference has validity as it 
recognizes the role of the legislature as an articulator of values and 
sometimes, as the protector, not the antagonist, of minorities and rights.  
Section 1 is not inconsistent with the Charter; instead it lies at the 
heart of the Charter enterprise. It is the first section in the Charter, 
applies to all rights and provides that government may limit them. It 
recognizes that, while the identified rights have great weight, there also 
are other values with heft. 
The democratic discussion, while protective of rights, does not allow 
them to trump in all circumstances. In part, this is because generous 
interpretations have been given to the rights. Freedom of expression is 
not just peaceful, political expression but any activity that conveys 
meaning.144 Freedom of religion is the freedom of an individual to 
harbour religious beliefs and undertake practices which he sincerely 
believes regardless of whether they are required by his religion.145 
Equality rights protect against purposive discrimination as well as 
neutral laws that have an adverse effect on individuals or groups.146 Once 
rights are defined in this manner, it is inevitable that there will be times 
when these rights must give away to other compelling values.  
When addressing an issue, there may be a number of acceptable 
ways to strike a balance between rights and the government objective. 
The very nature of democracy is that parties with conflicting views on 
issues succeed each other and become the government of the day. 
During one mandate, a party may choose one solution to a problem. 
During the next, another party may choose differently. Both may be 
legitimate choices in a democracy.  
The object of the Charter is both to protect rights and to provide a 
scale to weigh them against other values. The Oakes test, while helpful, 
                                                                                                             
143 “Constitutional Advocacy” (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 265, at 270.  
144 Irwin Toy, supra, note 101.  
145 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.). 
146 Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). 
292 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
when used exclusively leads to an atomistic evaluation of the law’s fine 
print. A purposive approach to rights asks us what we value in those 
rights. A purposive approach to section 1 invokes as profound an 
exploration — what do we value about a democracy; what do we value 
other than rights? Justice Wilson’s strict approach to section 1 
justification meant that her jurisprudence, while rich in many ways, 
applied a purposive approach to rights but failed to fully do so to the 
other half of the Charter equation. 
(b) After Her Departure 
After Justice Wilson’s departure, the Court continued in its quest to 
understand section 1. It stated that on complex social issues, the minimal 
impairment test is met if Parliament has chosen one of several 
reasonable alternatives.147 The means chosen need not be the least 
impairing option.148 The contextual factors to be considered under 
section 1 include the nature of the harm addressed (and the ability to 
measure it scientifically), the vulnerability of the group protected, 
ameliorative measures considered to address the harm, and the nature 
and importance of the infringed activity.149 
The Supreme Court has recently suggested that another relevant 
factor under section 1 is the record of government consultation with 
affected parties before a law is made.150 While it did not articulate why 
this factor was relevant, it could be argued that Charter rights-holders are 
constitutionally entitled to greater consultation than others because they 
are persons who, for insidious reasons, are typically excluded from the 
political process.  
Certainly Justice Wilson was of the view that governments in a 
democracy will generally further the interests of the majority. Therefore, 
judges in interpreting and applying the Charter, have to ask themselves 
which groups in society are typically shut out of the political process — 
the poor, the powerless, racial minorities, accused criminals. The courts 
must ensure that the rights of these groups are not sacrificed in the 
pursuit of majority goals.151 Justice Wilson held that, when determining 
                                                                                                             
147 Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] S.C.J. No. 30, [2007] 2 
S.C.R. 610, at para. 43 (S.C.C.). 
148 Harper, [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at 888 (S.C.C.). 
149 Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 139 (S.C.C.). 
150 Id., at para. 157. 
151 “The Making of a Constitution” (1988) 71 Judic. 334, at 338. 
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which discrete and insular minorities are protected by section 15 equality 
rights, political powerlessness was a factor to consider.152 A similar view 
likely has contributed to the Supreme Court’s holding that there is a 
constitutional duty to consult Aboriginal peoples before authorizing 
action that could diminish the value of the land or resources that they 
claim.153  
However, to shoehorn into section 1 a general duty to consult based 
on the idea that Charter rights-holders are politically powerless is less 
than persuasive. Many Charter rights-holders, whether they be media 
with their free expression rights, corporations with their right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure or parents with their right to make 
decisions concerning their children, are not politically powerless.154 
Further, before deciding who is politically powerless, it might be of 
assistance for the courts to have further information about the dynamics 
of a modern democracy, where power may be related to a number of 
factors including identity of interest, organizational capacity, ability to 
fundraise, access to media, etc., as well as to numbers alone. 
Further, section 1 does not ask the courts to consider whether 
politicians are conducting an appropriate democratic relationship with 
the citizenry. Put simply, the record of consultation with affected parties 
is the election and the debate in the legislature. If the judiciary believes 
that democracy requires more than representative government, it must in 
short order come to a sophisticated analysis of what that might be. 
Vibrant democracies do use mechanisms other than elections and 
legislative debates to ascertain popular will and to evaluate policy 
options, and these mechanisms, including consultation, can strengthen 
their legitimacy and effectiveness. However, the Charter does not 
mandate their use and it is difficult to imagine what formula could be 
devised to determine and monitor the appropriate mix of these 
mechanisms. 
Neither the political nor policy process ever follows the same steps 
in arriving at legislation. There are no Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
development of legislation. Sometimes legislation involves a 
                                                                                                             
152 Andrews, supra, note 146, at 152. 
153 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.). 
154 For a discussion of the views of Justice Wilson and others on the issue of whether 
judicial review should focus on disadvantaged groups because of their lack of access to the political 
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consultation process, expert panels, published policy papers, internal 
policy work, detailed Cabinet submissions and extensive legislative 
hearings. Other times it does not. Cabinet and the legislature are not a 
court of record. Their decisions should not be reviewed as though the 
relevant question is the evidence before them on which they based their 
decision. Politicians are in constant contact with the populace generally 
and interest groups specifically through correspondence, constituency 
offices, door-to-door visits, community meetings and “rubber chicken” 
dinners. They are entitled to take what they learn from these contacts 
into consideration, as well as information gleaned from a tailored policy 
process, when making decisions about legislation.155 
The political process in not better or worse than the judicial process; 
it is simply different. It would damage the strengths of the former to 
require it to act as if it were the latter. The Court’s job is not to supervise 
the political process but to examine, at the end of the day, how the 
legislation actually affects the rights of citizens and whether it attains 
desirable objectives. 
V. TAKING ADVICE 
As discussed, the Charter produced a revolution in the role of the 
judiciary. It also produced significant change in the operation of 
government, which must ensure that it is acting in accordance with 
constitutional norms when advancing legislation.156 For this reason, 
Justice Wilson stated that governments should seek advice from counsel 
as to whether proposed legislation meets Charter requirements and that 
to fail to do so would be “thoroughly irresponsible of governments and a 
dereliction of their obligation of Charter compliance”.157  
Most legislative provisions will never be tested in court and 
therefore much of the active protection of Charter rights occurs during 
the development of legislation. The Charter performs a valuable function 
by ensuring that the government is mindful of rights when making policy 
                                                                                                             
155 The Attorney General of Ontario successfully made similar arguments when resisting the 
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and demanding that it more closely analyze its reasons for proceeding. 
The requirement of minimal impairment, in particular, is a powerful tool 
for ensuring a careful selection among policy options.  
The government, in assessing constitutionality, takes its cue from the 
Supreme Court, which has the final word on the interpretation of the 
Constitution.158 However, moves made by Justice Wilson and other 
members of the early Court, including an emphasis on constitutional 
growth and a weakened approach to stare decisis, have made judicial 
pronouncements more provisional, providing the government with less 
guidance.  
The Supreme Court, in the recent case of Hislop,159 returned to a 
number of themes identified in the early years of Charter interpretation. 
It confirmed that constitutional law changes because the Constitution is 
not static but adapts to the times through a process of evolutionary 
interpretation.160 If previous interpretations of the Constitution no longer 
correspond to societal realities, the Supreme Court must change the 
law.161 
However, the Supreme Court provided some relief to the government 
in cases where it had enacted legislation relying on existing 
jurisprudence, and subsequently the Court made a substantial change to 
that jurisprudence which rendered the legislation unconstitutional.162 In 
such a case, it would award a claimant prospective but not retroactive 
relief as the latter might prove highly disruptive to a government which, 
relying on the law as it stood, had framed budgets or designed social 
programs.163 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Justice Wilson was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada at the 
inception of a great historical project: the Charter. She had behind her a 
Canadian and British legal tradition which, at times, could be black-
letter and formalistic, leading to results that were out of touch with 
                                                                                                             
158 Hislop, supra, note 156, at 476. 
159 Id. 
160 Id., at 468.  
161 Id., at 477. 
162 Id., at 469-70. Substantial change was defined as the overruling of precedent or giving 
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interpretation. 
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current realities. She was anxious to ensure that this did not happen with 
the Charter and she joined with others on the Court to adopt interpretive 
approaches that made the Charter an active guarantee of individual 
rights. As a serious scholar of the Charter she confronted its flashpoints, 
including social change, the proper relationship between the individual 
and the state and judicial deference. Justice Wilson had an engagement 
to keep with history. We should keep her engagement with the Charter 
as an exemplar for our own. 
 
